Mueller Report Books

Other Social Sciences

Agency and Action (Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement; by John and Helen Steward, editors Hyman

By John and Helen Steward, editors Hyman

This selection of unique essays through major philosophers covers the full variety of the philosophy of motion.

Show description

Read Online or Download Agency and Action (Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement; 55) PDF

Best other social sciences books

Perspectives in Sociology: Classical and Contemporary

Views in Sociology offers scholars with a full of life and demanding advent to sociology and to the ways that sociologists are expert to imagine and paintings. the topic is gifted as a chain of alternative views at the social global, them all interrelated, occasionally in clash with each other, and all contributing very important and beneficial insights.

Extra info for Agency and Action (Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement; 55)

Sample text

What we do, in working from an objective to a subjective principle, is to turn a requirement or reason which would obtain if things were as the agent supposes into one that in fact obtains for an agent who merely takes things to be so, whether they are so or not. Another way of putting this is to say that we start from a statement about a requirement or reason that would be in place if the agent were right in what he believes, and then say that a different requirement or reason is already in place because that other one would be, were circumstances different from the way they actually are.

The 'because' in them need not be understood as 'for the reason that'. But it does mean that the causal status of A-type explanations is in doubt, for two reasons. First, it is not as if the relevant normative principles themselves recommend any causal relation between mental states and action, so that if they are satisfied, some form of causation must be going on. Second, the sort of intelligibility generated by an A-type explanation is quite different from that generated by B-type ones, which all allow to be causal.

But examples of this sort are in fact ill suited to shed light on the idea of 'practical knowledge', which is the true focus of the idea of the non-observational in the study of action. When we see this we will be better able to see why Anscombe is concerned with the non-observational in the first place, and how this concern is tied to other characteristic Anscombian theses, for instance that an action will be intentional under some descriptions but not others, and that practical knowledge is distinguished from 1 G.

Download PDF sample

Rated 4.96 of 5 – based on 15 votes